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Abstract
As globalization has led to ever higher levels of labor mobility,
so the volume of funds remitted to their families by workers
employed in countries far distant from their homes has
increased by leaps and bounds. The total volume of such
transfers currently amounts to over U.S.$100 billion per
annum, the greater part of which flows from economically
advanced regions in the West and North to developing coun-
tries in the East and South. Delivering those funds swiftly, reli-
ably, and cheaply to relatively remote destinations opens up
new opportunities for the financial services industry, but also
represents a major logistical challenge.
Although many banks and money transfer agencies have
recently begun to consider how they can make the most of
these opportunities, those that seek to enter this field soon
find that they are up against very effective competition: the
Informal Value Transfer Systems which many migrant groups
have themselves developed to meet this challenge. In a post
9/11 context, there has been much fevered discussion about
the threat which such ‘underground banking’ networks
allegedly present to the stability of the global order. In an
effort to replace ill-informed speculation with empirically
grounded detail, this paper demonstrates the extent to which
such informal networks have developed in such a way that
they now provide a highly efficient response to the logistical
challenge of delivering migrant remittances. In doing so it also
sets the scene for a more informed debate about how IVTS
networks might best be regulated. 
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The growth of migration and remittances in the
contemporary world
In the context of an ever more globalized labor market, many
millions of people are now living and working in locations far
distant from their countries of origin, and to which they regu-
larly remit a substantial proportion of their earnings. The
financial flows generated by migrant remittances in this sense
are by now very substantial. Although accurate figures are
extremely hard to come by, it is not unreasonable to suggest
that the current flow of transnational value-transfers current-
ly generated by migrant workers amounts to at least U.S.$100
billion per annum, and perhaps a good deal more. 
Nevertheless migrant workers are far from being a homoge-
neous socio-economic category. Although the professionally
qualified employees of multinational companies now tend to
display high levels of spatial mobility during the course of their
careers, such high-fliers only make up a very small proportion
of the global stock of migrant workers. Instead the vast major-
ity work at far lower levels in the occupational hierarchy. But
although their wages are only a small fraction of those
enjoyed by the high fliers, most display a much higher propen-
sity to save, so much so that they frequently send a substan-
tial proportion of their relatively meager incomes back to their
kinsfolk in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The size of the
resultant transactions, examined one by one, is very small. The
vast majority of migrants rarely remit much more than a few
hundred dollars a month, mere penny packets in banking
terms. However it is the volume of such transactions which
gives them their current significance, no less locally than glob-
ally. In many countries of the developing world migrant remit-
tances now form the largest single source of foreign exchange,
comfortably exceeding the sum of all forms of development
assistance and FDI.1
Not only has the scale of these remittance flows grown very
rapidly in recent years, but so, too, has the logistical challenge
of delivering them, not least because so many of their recipi-
ents live in remote rural areas, far beyond the reach of the for-
mal banking system. However a growing number of stakehold-
ers — stretching from migrants themselves to their families and
countries of origin to the International Development Com-
munity — have an interest in ensuring that migrant remittances
are as swift, reliable, and above all cheap as possible.2 It follows,
therefore, that the recent rapid growth in South-North labor
migration, and the concomitant growth of remittance transfers
in the reverse directions, presents both a major new challenge
and an equally substantial set of novel commercial opportuni-
ties to the financial services industry. This paper explores the
ways in which those opportunities have so far been met, iden-
tifies the kinds of institutional initiatives which have emerged
to meet them, and on that basis seeks to look forward to the
likely course of future developments. 
Although migrants have always played a major part in provid-
ing the labor power needed to fuel urban and industrial
growth, and despite the fact that they continue to be a vital
source of menial workers in most post-industrial societies, and
most especially those with plummeting birth-rates, their
arrival has rarely been planned or centrally coordinated.
Moreover all efforts to achieve such coordination invariably
fail, for one very obvious reason. Migrant workers are not only
invariably self-selecting, they also behave as self-motivated
entrepreneurs whose principal concern is to advance the
interests of themselves and their kinsfolk.3 Migrants have
always acted thus. No less than the millions of European
migrants who crossed the Atlantic during the 19th and the 20th
century, their ever more numerous successors from Asia,
North Africa, and Latin America seeking their fortunes in the
affluent cities of other continents are pursuing their own
agendas on their own terms. In doing so they not only aimed
to make the most of the income-earning opportunities avail-
able at their destination, but were equally committed to
increasing the wealth, and hence the status, of their families
and their communities back home.4
Yet although a reverse flow of remittances follows the arrival
of migrant remittances almost as surely as night follows day,
until very recently the formally constituted financial sector
made no ordered efforts to respond to this rapidly expanding
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population of migrant workers’ consequent need to find a safe,
speedy, and reliable means of transferring their savings back
to their kinsfolk, especially when, as was very often the case,
they lived in relatively remote rural areas. Hence just as the
migrants organized their own means of entry into destination
labor markets, which in many cases involve risking their lives,
they also devised their own means of sending savings back
home. Whilst the physical transfer of currency notes was the
most obvious way of doing so, long-distance migrants, and
especially those whose residence rights were uncertain, were
unable to make home visits with any frequency. But as they
soon discovered, the formally constituted financial sector was
ill-equipped to meet their needs. Over and above delivery
problems, the commissions charged by banks, let alone by
specialist money-transmission agencies, such as Western
Union, consumed an alarmingly significant portion of their
hard-earned savings. Hence wherever groups of labor-
migrants established ethnic colonies of any size they invari-
ably went on to develop their own self-constructed strategies
of informal value transmission.
As the years have passed, most of these informal alternatives
have become steadily more sophisticated, aided by advance-
ments in communication technology, particularly in terms of
the development of fax and then the Internet, which have
made it possible to organize larger-scale value transfers with
speed, accuracy, and with high levels of reliability. Hence
whilst these informal transfer systems went largely unnoticed
during their initial years of development, with the turn of the
century they suddenly became the focus of much higher lev-
els of institutional attention. There were two reasons for this
sea change. In the first place once millions and then tens of
millions of dollars began to be transmitted through these
Informal Value Transfer Systems (IVTS), they began to be suf-
ficiently large as to make blips on institutional radar screens.
Hence a number of major banks, led by those based in the U.S.
with an outreach into Latin American markets, began to
explore whether it made commercial sense to make a more
active response to the potentially-profitable business of facili-
tating remittance transfers. Secondly, and ultimately even
more importantly, questions began to be asked about the
extent to which these IVTS networks were being used to pro-
vide a cover for laundering the profits of drug smuggling. And
although initial reports5 were rather skeptical about the extent
to which IVTS was actually being used as a vehicle for criminal
malfeasance, rather than a convenient means of facilitating
wholly legitimate remittance transfer, the whole debate was
transformed in the aftermath of the events of 9/11. Even
though the greater part of the 9/11 operation was financed by
wire transfers into personal accounts opened at the Suntrust
Bank in Venice, Florida6, a mass of luridly-written articles soon
appeared in the press suggesting that Hawala/IVTS networks
were in fact a wholly unregulated form of ‘underground bank-
ing’ which provided drugs smugglers and terrorists a vehicle
for financing their evil deeds. Hence, despite the absence of
any substantial body of evidence supporting such accusations,
governments throughout the world have found themselves
under ever increasing pressure, for the most part articulated
by the U.S. Treasury, to introduce regulatory measures which
could in effect put all such informal operations out of business. 
However, as everyone within the financial services industry is
now very well aware, draconian initiatives whose central objec-
tives were to counter both money laundering and terrorist
financing were by no means limited to the informal sector.
Suddenly virtually every agency engaged in any kind of finan-
cial transactions on behalf of personal customers found them-
selves required to introduce elaborate Know Your Customer
procedures, and also under a duty, backed up by severe crimi-
nal sanctions, to submit ‘suspicious transaction reports’, espe-
cially in the case of cash transactions in excess of U.S.$10,000.
Whether this new regulatory environment is having any effect
on the problems it is designed to confront remains to be seen.
What is undoubtedly the case, however, is that as a conse-
quence of these initiatives it is not just IVTS networks which
have found themselves under pressure. Financial institutions
of all kinds now find themselves faced with the necessarily
expensive task of gathering and recording a great deal more
personal data about their clients and their transactions than
they had hitherto collected, and even then can often find
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themselves in an uneasy position for fear that they might find
themselves charged with colluding in criminal activity.
A new opportunity for the financial services
industry?
Yet despite the costly downside of these new, albeit still much
disputed, regulatory regimes, these post-9/11 developments
may, at least on the face of it, have opened up a major new
opportunity for the financial services industry. A stable, and
indeed a steadily expanding flow of value transfer to the tune
of U.S.$100 billion per annum is certainly not an opportunity
to be sniffed at, most especially when regulatory authorities
around the globe are actively encouraging the formal banking
sector to become much more heavily involved in providing
services in this sphere, thereby providing migrant workers
with an alternative to what the burgeoning AML/CFT industry
regards as deeply suspect IVTS and Hawala networks. 
Yet despite the obvious opportunities that these develop-
ments have thrown up, those players who have sought to
enter this sector of the global foreign exchange market appear
to be finding the going extremely tough. Devising a commer-
cially viable response to the specific character of customer
demands in this sphere is proving to be far from easy, not least
because their competitors in the ‘informal’ sector still appear
to occupy a position of clear competitive advantage, despite
the high levels of official harassment to which they have
recently found themselves subjected. 
So just what are the financial and logistical requirements of a
successful remittance transfer operation? Overall volume is not
a problem. What does cause severe problems is the logistics of
such operations. Given that individual transfers are mostly in
penny packets, most transfers require funds to be converted
into relatively obscure currencies, most senders prefer to make
their deposits in cash, and recipients frequently live in rural
areas, and hence well beyond the banking frontier.
In view of these challenges it is hardly surprising that special-
ist cash delivery operations based in the formal sector, of
which Western Union is currently the most salient example,
regularly charge a commission of around 15% for their servic-
es, and even then their delivery-coverage is largely restricted
to major urban centers, especially in the developing world.
From the perspective of ill-paid migrant workers a cut of 15%
on their hard-earned wages appears to be quite outrageous,
especially since the margin charged by operators in the infor-
mal sector is dramatically smaller, often 2% or less. Why, then,
does Western Union find it necessary to charge so much? And
how, by contrast, do operators in the informal sector manage
to offer a service which is just as reliable and with a much
greater spatial reach whilst charging so much less? 
The answer to the first question is obvious enough. Serving
the financial needs of millions of migrant remitters drawn from
developing countries is an accountant’s nightmare. Given that
the packet-size of each transaction is small and the delivery
address is so often as remote as it is obscure, not only must
elaborate and expensive arrangements to consolidate and
then to deconsolidate these small packages at each end of the
transmission chain be developed, but a process of currency
exchange, on a wholesale basis of course, must also be imple-
mented somewhere along the way. Because of the large num-
ber of the administrative staff required to implement these
processes when conventional bureaucratic procedures are
employed, costs are necessarily high. No matter how hard
they try to cut down on administrative costs, Western Union
and its many emerging rivals within the formal sector see lit-
tle prospect of reducing their commission charges by much
from their present levels. No wonder their competitors in the
informal sector are currently having a field day. How, though,
are they managing to pull it off?
The roots of Hawala
In the U.K. the Pakistani community, which is currently around
three quarters of a million strong, is the most active sources
of migrant remittances, and its members are collectively
responsible for sending anywhere between £500 million
(approximately U.S.$ 900 million) and £1 billion (approximately
U.S.$ 1.8 billion) per year back to Pakistan.7 Apart from a brief
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blip when Customs and Excise arrested a series of major
Hawaladars and charged them with money-laundering, the
greater part of these funds were transferred back to Pakistan
through the informally grounded Hawala system, often
through deals facilitated in Dubai. However Pakistanis are not
alone in using this system. To my knowledge similar Dubai-cen-
tered transfer networks have also been established by immi-
grants from Bangladesh, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and
Somalia. Such networks also facilitate transfers from immi-
grants who have established themselves across the length and
breadth of the E.U. 
These networks did not spring into existence out of the blue.
Whilst the growth of migrant remittances may have dramati-
cally boosted the scale and scope of contemporary Hawala
networks, the roots of these operations can be traced back to
the ancient system of commercial banking, which grew up to
serve the needs of long-distance traders in the Indian Ocean
region. In their original format Hawala networks emerged to
oil the wheels of commercial activity, meeting the needs of
long-distance traders who wanted to transport the bullion
they needed to finance their activities. A deposit made with a
Hawaladar in one market place (the Gujarati port of Surat, for
example) could be picked up as a credit from that Hawaladar’s
corresponding partner in Basra, Mogadishu, or Malacca. 
As a result of completing such transactions on their cus-
tomers’ behalf, corresponding Hawaladars were constantly
shifting debits and credits between one another. Just as in any
other banking system, Hawaladars were prepared to take
these positions because those within any given network trust-
ed their partners to honor each other’s instructions, and
above all to make up any net deficiencies as and when a set-
tlement was eventually implemented. Although system securi-
ty was as crucial a feature of these operations as it is in any
other banking system, its foundations were grounded in the
cultural and religious context of the times. Medieval
Hawaladars largely eschewed the elaborate clerical and
bureaucratic procedures, such as regular inspection of partic-
ipants’ records by accountants and regulators, around which
contemporary Western-style banking systems are routinely
constructed. Indeed the only external authority to whom
Hawaladars (the vast majority of whom were Muslims) were
responsible was Allah himself. 
But, although most Hawaladars took, and still take, the treat of
Divine sanctions seriously, none are so idealistic as to rely on
that as the principal source of system security. Instead they
relied on relationships of absolute trust. Not only did the sys-
tem rely on customers having absolute confidence in their
Hawaladars’ reliability, the Hawaladars themselves needed to
have a similarly comprehensive level of trust in each other’s
honesty. This was necessary since due to the distances cov-
ered there were imbalances between the participants for long
periods at a time.
Because of the need for absolute trust, it is hardly surprising
to find that each network of corresponding Hawaladars,
together with their customer-base, was normally language,
religion, and hence community-specific. From this perspective
Hawala networks are best understood as an Islamic version of
a much wider range of pre-modern forms of long-distance
value transmission and settlement, to which parallel Hindu and
Chinese forms of IVTS also emerged during the mediaeval
period, and likewise remain in operation to this day. Moreover
it is quite clear that whilst each such system has its own spe-
cific set of cultural and religious roots, all are constructed
around translocal networks of absolute interpersonal trust.
These not only provide a secure channel of communication
between spatially separated financial operators, but are also
the foundations of a web of binding reciprocities which pro-
vides, in each case, a bedrock of system security.
Whilst religious and sectarian loyalties provided the basic
foundations of such networks, these were, and still are, rou-
tinely reinforced by ties of kinship and marriage between the
participants, so generating an even tighter web of mutual rec-
iprocities. Hence it is through the operation of such informal-
ly constituted networks, rather than through the implementa-
tion of formal bureaucratic procedures of paper trails and
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audit inspections, that IVTS networks have characteristically
achieved a condition of self-regulation. Whilst reliance on self-
regulation in this sense may seem as old-fashioned as it is
insecure, it is worth remembering that so long as the networks
within which these transactions are implemented have an all
encompassing impact on their members’ lives, sanctions
against malfeasance, no matter how informal their founda-
tions, can be as far-reaching as they are severe. Breach of
trust characteristically leads to swift and comprehensive
social ex-communication not just of the offender, but also of
his entire family; and because these networks are now becom-
ing ever more transnational in character, flight offers fewer
and fewer opportunities for escape. 
The gradual eclipse and subsequent revival of
Hawala
Financial operations only survive if they can sustain a position
of competitive advantage, and IVTS systems are no exception.
When European adventurers initially broke into Indian Ocean
trading systems in the 16th century they soon found that they
had little alternative but to make extensive use of locally con-
stituted financial services, and for straightforward commercial
reasons they continued to do so until the beginning of the 19th
Century. But as Imperial domination became steadily more
comprehensive, European banks gained a dominant position in
major trading centers all around the Indian Ocean. As a result
more indigenous providers of financial services were driven
steadily outwards towards the social, geographical, and eco-
nomic periphery of the system. 
However, in the post-colonial world four key developments
have facilitated the resurgence of IVTS operations in general,
and of Hawala in particular. Firstly, the imposition of over-tight
exchange controls in many parts of the Indian Ocean region
has resulted in the emergence of a vibrant black market in for-
eign exchange. Secondly, as the number of labor-migrants
from all over the region to the Gulf and Euro-America grew so
did the amount of migrant remittances. Thirdly, the rapid
growth of manufacturing activity in East and South East Asia
has lead to an upsurge in intra-regional trade in manufactured
goods. Finally, radical improvements in communications tech-
nology — including fax, internet, cell- and satellite phones —
have made such transfers more efficient. Taken together,
these developments rapidly gave Hawala operations a new
lease of life.
How do contemporary IVTS systems actually
work?
Although Hawala networks and other similarly structured IVTS
operations are often described as providing underground
banking services to their clients, it is worth remembering that
Hawaladars do not provide retail banking facilities, such as
current accounts, taking deposits, or making loans. Instead
IVTS networks are best understood as specialist forex agen-
cies whose sole purpose is to facilitate value transfers over
long distances and between different currency regimes, and in
so doing specialize in the delivery of relatively small sums to
recipients based in remote destinations in the developing
world. 
Fulfilling that specialist role is far from straightforward. Even
though the gross annual flow of credits into any given labor
exporting country may well amount to several billions of dol-
lars per annum, closer inspection soon reveals that organizing
the swift, reliable, and efficient delivery of innumerable small
packets of value on a global scale is a major logistical chal-
lenge. With that in mind it is worth running through just what
kind of activities the task necessarily entails. 
It goes without saying that in meeting this challenge
Hawaladars rarely become involved in the physical transfer of
currency notes across international borders. Instead they use
familiar banking processes of consolidation, deconsolidation,
and settlement whenever and wherever they possibly can.
Hence Hawaladars’ collection, transmission, and delivery oper-
ations have three core elements, all of which are closely inter-
connected.
The first is information processing, which deals with provision
of current exchange rates to prospective senders, collection of
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data from senders about how much is to be delivered where
and to whom, and the transmission of delivery data to the
remote destination.
The second is value transmission and settlement, which
means that they need to organize availability provision of
credit at the point of delivery against accumulated debits at
the point of deposit, so enabling the organization of subse-
quent processes of settlement. 
The third element is collection and delivery of currency notes,
which involves collection and consolidation of senders’
deposits and the onward transmission of these funds to set-
tlement partners, and the deconsolidation of credits received
from settlement partners and their distribution to assigned
recipients at a variety of overseas destinations.
Since all remittance agencies, be they formally constituted
banks or Hawaladars operating in the informal sector, face the
same set of technical and logistical challenges, it is worth
exploring which of the two is in a position to implement this
complex set of tasks with the highest level of effectiveness,
efficiency, and reliability.
A concrete example: the transfer of remittances
from the U.K. to Pakistan’s Mirpur District 
More than a third of a million people whose ancestral origins
lie in Mirpur District are resident in the in the U.K., most of
whom keep in close touch with their kinsfolk back home. Not
only are visits back and forth extremely frequent (PIA oper-
ates no less than ten flights into Manchester every week), but
many of the pioneer settlers who arrived in the U.K. forty
years ago have now retired, and are now taking the opportu-
nity to use their accumulated savings to build splendid new
houses for themselves back in Mirpur.8 As a result, remittances
from U.K. to Mirpur are currently running at somewhere in the
region of £250 million (approximately U.S.$ 450 million) per
annum, the greater part of which passes through Hawala net-
works. Delivery is routinely achieved within 48 hours, with no
significant organizational fuss and 100% reliability. From the
customer’s perspective sending money back to Mirpur could
hardly be more straightforward. All they have to do is
approach their local Pakistani travel agent (the vast majority
of whom offer such services, either in their own right, or as the
agent of a larger Hawala operator based in a city which sup-
ports a large local Pakistani population), enquire about and
agree upon a rate of exchange, prove their identity (a require-
ment of the recently introduced anti-money laundering regu-
lations), make the agreed payment, and provide the recipient’s
name and address in Mirpur. Within 48 hours the sum agreed
upon will be ready for collection in Mirpur. 
So how is it all achieved? As ever the back-office mechanisms
which support these apparently straightforward front-office
results are extremely complex, so much so that they are best
considered in a series of stages, all of which have to be fitted
smoothly together for the whole operation to produce the
desired result.
The collection of sterling in U.K. and the delivery
of rupees in Mirpur 
In front-office terms, Hawaladars engaged in collecting and
dispatching remittance transfers necessarily work in close col-
laboration with a corresponding partner operating at the des-
tination(s) to which those remittances are dispatched.
Moreover if we leave the issue of settlement to one side for
the moment, implementing the component of the deal which
matters to the customer, namely the delivery of rupees to the
recipient, is simply dependent on the swift and accurate trans-
mission of the appropriate delivery instructions. However to
send separate messages for every single transaction would be
highly inefficient, consolidation is the order of the day. Hence
each consolidating Hawaladar (and for clarity’s sake let us
identify him as Ha operating in Birmingham9) will make up a
list, setting out all daily transactions with over-the-counter
customers and those passed on to him by a network of agents
and sub-agents operating in smaller Pakistani communities
elsewhere in the U.K. Then it is a simple enough task to fax the
spreadsheet to his corresponding partner Hb, operating in
Mirpur, who can promptly set about organizing the local deliv-
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ery of rupees to recipients as instructed, and where necessary
using his own network of agents and sub-agents to make deliv-
eries to recipients resident in villages in the more remote
parts of the District. Please note that there has been no trans-
fer of value from Ha to Hb. Corresponding Hawaladars are
ready and willing to take on such a position of indebtedness
given the relationship of trust between them, but at some
stage that condition must of necessity be discharged.
Organizing settlement
Because the majority of migrant workers are drawn from rela-
tively remote rural areas the most distributing Hawaladars
operate in regions where there is no significant local demand
for foreign exchange. That is certainly the case in Mirpur, so Hb
rarely if ever has local customers interested in exchanging
rupees for the sterling credits which he is constantly accumu-
lating with Ha in Birmingham. However, in Pakistan’s commer-
cial capital, a thousand miles away in Karachi there is an
almost insatiable demand for access to hard currency, for
which members of the local business elite are frequently pre-
pared to pay premium rate. Hence the informal money mar-
kets in Mirpur and Karachi are effectively mirror-images of
one another. This provides an obvious opportunity to organize
and implement complementary back-to-back settlements, with
the added risk of having to move the cash between these two
cities, which in most cases require hiring of armed guards.
Karachi’s Hawala market 
Like many other developing countries, Pakistan has long suf-
fered from a severe deficit in its balance of trade, which is only
partially remedied by remittances and other invisible exports.
Since Karachi is Pakistan’s commercial capital as well as the
country’s principal entrepôt, a major manufacturing sector,
the city has long supported a pent-up demand for foreign
exchange to settle invoices for manufactured goods imported
from overseas, to purchase education, medical treatment, and
property overseas, to aid the wealthy to export capital to hard-
currency tax-havens beyond the purview of the Pakistani
authorities, and to replenish the State Bank’s foreign-currency
reserves.
In these circumstances the outflow of migrant workers to the
Gulf, the U.K, and the U.S, together with migrant workers’ con-
stant search for cheaper and more effective means of getting
their remittances back home, has given a powerful boost to
Karachi’s informal money market. 
As compared with Hawaladars serving the needs of migrant
workers, their counterparts in Karachi operate in a very dif-
ferent kind of financial context. Not only are the majority of
their customers drawn from the city’s business and profes-
sional elite, but such orders for U.S.$ are invariably on a sub-
stantial scale. Hence a single order for U.S.$ in Karachi may
well generate a sufficient quantum of rupees to meet a week’s
worth of daily out-payments in penny packages handles by Hb
in Mirpur. Final settlement can only be achieved when the
hard-currency credits held by Ha in Birmingham have been
transferred to the destinations specified by the customers of
Hc in Karachi. 
Dubai as a settlement hub
Most such deals are currently brokered in Dubai. Why Dubai?
Not only has Dubai taken advantage of the boom in the price
of oil to establish itself as the Gulf’s most important commer-
cial entrepôt, but as a result of its close proximity to Bombay
and Karachi, the stability of the Dihrams link to the dollar, and
its consequent condition of unrestricted access to the global
financial system, it has become South Asia’s premier offshore
banking center. So it is that Dubai’s Exchange houses have
come to play a key role as facilitators of remittance and com-
mercially-driven Hawala settlements not just to serve the
financial needs of the very substantial migrant-worker popula-
tion in the oil-rich regions which surround it, but also on an
ever more global scale. Hence with their newly established
headquarters in Dubai, Hawala networks, which have their
roots in mediaeval practices, have once again begun to oil the
wheels of trade in the entire Indian Ocean region.10
A worked example
With all this in mind, a worked example, albeit much simpli-
fied, may provide a clearer and more concrete indication of
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just how the whole settlement process operates. Let us sup-
pose that Ha in Birmingham has taken orders for the delivery
of Rs. 10 million in Mirpur, for which he has received £75,000
from his U.K.-based customers. Meanwhile Hc in Karachi has a
customer who wished to purchase $100,000 in order to set-
tle the invoice for a consignment of televisions which he has
imported from China, whose manufacturer is expecting pay-
ment to be made into his U.S.$ account in Hong Kong. Ha and
Hc separately approach a specialist settlement broker in
Dubai, Hd, who calculates (for the sake of argument) that Rs.
10 million = U.S.$ 100,000 = £75,000, so generating an ideal
opportunity to arrange a back-to-back swap. Hence Hd sets up
a Hawala settlement in which Ha buys U.S.$ 100,000 on
London money market through his bank which he promptly
sends by TT to Hd’s account with Bank of America in New
York; meanwhile Hc takes delivery of Rs. 10 million in cash
from his television-importing customer, which he promptly
dispatches by road to Hb in Mirpur, thereby recompensing Hb
for the disbursements made in response to Ha’s previously
faxed instructions; and last but not least Hd transfers
U.S.$100,000 by TT from his account in New York to the tele-
vision manufacturer’s account in Hong Kong, thus fully clos-
ing the circle. 
However it goes without saying that this is only a hugely sim-
plified example, and that in the real deals such settlements are
a great deal more complex. Hence in the instance cited, there
is every prospect that Hc in Karachi would approach Ha in
Birmingham directly, and having found a neat match between
their immediate financial requirements would do a simple
swap between themselves, such that there would be no need
to look to Hd, who would inevitably take a small percentage cut
on the deal to facilitate such a settlement. 
In practice, opportunities to implement neatly managed swaps
involving such large sums are relatively rare, given that
Hawaladars operate in such a wide variety of national arenas,
from which they seek to make deals in many different curren-
cies in tranches which very rarely match up anything like so
neatly as they do in the example cited. It follows that since
mix’n’match settlements are extremely complex to set up, they
regularly require the lubricating assistance of brokers in Dubai
if such exercises are to be swiftly and smoothly implemented.
Moreover all the evidence of the resultant settlement trans-
actions which I have so far been able to obtain suggests that
they are conducted on a very substantial scale, since the 
basic unit of account in making such deals appears to be
U.S.$100,000. 
How secure is IVTS/Hawala as far as its retail
customers are concerned?
Whilst billions of dollars are processed through Dubai-based
IVTS/Hawala networks every year, it is striking that despite the
absence of any kind of central registry, let alone a central reg-
ulator, serious customer complaints are virtually unknown.
How can this be? The basic answer is quite straightforward:
like the pre-colonial structures from which they evolved, con-
temporary Hawala networks are best understood as distrib-
uted systems in which system security is rooted in the transna-
tionally extended relationships of absolute trust which partic-
ipating Hawaladars routinely maintain between themselves.
Given that all members of the network are active participants
in the whole enterprise, system security is not only a matter of
collective concern, but is also articulated from the bottom up,
in sharp contrast to the top-down patterns of external scruti-
ny and regulation which contemporary Western-style banking
systems routinely deploy for that purpose. 
It is also worth emphasizing that such informal methods of
guaranteeing system security are far from being an outmod-
ed hangover from by-gone age. Quite the contrary, such prac-
tices appear to be the prime source of the system’s competi-
tive advantage, above all because they allow large swathes of
operationally redundant clerical and bureaucratic activity to
be stripped out of the system. By doing so, Hawaladars are
able cut down information transmission to the minimum level
required to implement the task in hand, so enabling their core
business of value transmission to be implemented with the
maximum level of speed, reliability, and efficiency. Moreover
having adopted such a lean and mean approach to the data
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which they choose to transmit between themselves,
Hawaladars have typically taken immediate advantage of
developments in communications technology. Hence in addi-
tion to landlines and mobile phones, Hawaladars have moved
rapidly onwards through fax, email, network portals and
secure Virtual Private Networks as a means of information
transmission amongst themselves, whilst all of the larger
operators, and an increasing number of smaller ones, have
now begun to plug directly into inter-bank electronic value
transfer systems, such as BACS and SWIFT. 
Given the manifest commercial efficiency with which contem-
porary Hawala systems cope with the logistical challenges
thorn up by migrant workers’ financial services requirements,
as well as the ever-greater technical sophistication of the
transfer and settlement processes which they have developed
in order to meet those requirements, the use of the term
‘informal’ as means of characterizing the system as a whole
needs to be approached with considerable care. In the first
place, any suggestion that Hawala’s informal character means
that it is ‘a system without records,’ as those who suspect that
the whole exercise is merely a convenient cover for criminal
activity frequently argue, falls by the wayside. Despite their
commitment to reducing clerical procedures to a minimum,
there is no way in which Hawaladars could deal accurately and
efficiently with transactions of the complexity to which remit-
tance transfer processes give rise without extensive record-
keeping. Secondly, and consequently, ‘informality’ is not to be
confused with back of the envelope procedures. On the con-
trary Hawaladars have been much quicker to make use of the
efficiency gains which can be extracted from recent develop-
ments in electronic communications than their rivals in the
formal banking sector. 
This immediately prompts a further question. Could it be that
the competitive advantage currently enjoyed by contempo-
rary IVTS networks is similar to the advantages Internet-based
retail banks have over their branch-based competitors that are
struggling with the crippling costs of maintaining a presence
on the high street?
Regulation: Is Hawala broke? And does it need
fixing?
Whilst there can be no doubt whatsoever that Hawala net-
works, as well as their Chinese and Latin American equiva-
lents, provide an excellent deal from the perspective of the
many millions of migrant workers who regularly utilize their
facilities, the prospect that these informal, and currently
almost completely unregulated, systems might also have sig-
nificant operational down-sides also needs careful considera-
tion. It is, therefore, important to determine how secure such
value transmissions are, as far as its retail customers are con-
cerned, and how vulnerable such networks are to criminal pen-
etration?
Efforts to answer these questions have recently begun to pre-
cipitate a debate about how, on what basis, and to what ends
this increasingly significant corner of the global foreign
exchange market might best be regulated. Four equally press-
ing questions have now begun to be posed within that debate: 
■ To what extent do current Hawala networks have any in-
built guarantees of system security?
■ If these guarantees are either absent or inadequate, what
measures might realistically be introduced to improve 
current levels of system security?
■ Is there any way in which adequate and effective regulato-
ry measures can be introduced whilst still retaining the
strengths of such systems’ informal procedures?
■ Should all efforts be concentrated on driving all these 
dangerously informal financial transfers into the properly
regulated forex channels maintained by the formal bank-
ing sector? 
How vulnerable are contemporary Hawala 
systems to criminal penetration? 
Yet, even if we accept that these informal systems have been
providing an efficient, effective, and above all a reliable
response to the logistical challenges thrown up by the excep-
tionally rapid growth in the North to South remittance delivery
market in recent years, the priorities of the regulatory author-
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ities have undergone a sea-change since 9/11. Hence whilst
customer-protection still remains a significant component of
the regulatory agenda, measures to curb money-laundering in
general, and the financing of terrorist activities in particular,
have suddenly leapt to the head of many agencies’ concerns.
Given that IVTS networks stand beyond the reach of any kind
external regulation, alarmist accounts of their vulnerability to
criminal penetration are now regularly articulated in all man-
ner of official reports, most particularly those emanating from
North America. 
Yet despite these regularly articulated concerns, which have in
turn led to the introduction of a swathe of anti-money laun-
dering initiatives with which the entire financial services sec-
tor, formal as well as informal, is now required to conform,
much less attention has yet been paid to determining just how
far the informal sector has actually been used for such nefar-
ious purposes. In a similar vein it is also worth noting that
there have been even fewer efforts to explore whether the raft
of anti-money laundering initiatives, with which all institutions
in the formally constituted financial services sector have to
comply, have had any significant impact on their nominal tar-
gets. If, as I strongly suspect, their impact so far has been
more symbolic than real, it is high time to consider what alter-
native initiatives might be expected to produce the desired
result. 
Before proceeding further it is also worth reminding ourselves
that money-laundering is a catch-all term covering a wide vari-
ety of different forms of financial malfeasance. Not only does
the extent and character of their ‘criminality’ vary enormous-
ly, but there are excellent reasons for suggesting that only a
small minority of the transactions so labeled are associated
either with drug-smuggling or with terrorist finances. Instead
the vast majority are the outcome of strategies which both
individuals and corporations regularly devise as a means of
confounding the efforts of national governments to tax their
income, to impose excise duties on goods they wish to import
or export, and/or to impose restrictions on their ability to
export funds into alternative financial jurisdictions. The result-
ant contradictions are of long standing. Just as states have
always needed to tax their subjects in order to finance their
activities, their subjects have done their best to avoid them.
Consequently, if Hawala networks also provide support for
such evasive strategies, which they almost certainly do for
people of the developing world, we should not be greatly sur-
prised. However such strategies are in no sense unique to the
informal sector. On the contrary, it seems quite clear that all
the biggest players, as well as the vast bulk of the funds laun-
dered in this sense, slip with ease between on- and offshore
institutions which are firmly located within the formally con-
stituted financial sector.11
AML/CFT
What, though, about transactions at the much more serious
end of the money-laundering spectrum, drug smuggling and
terrorist financing? Here we move into even shadier financial
arenas. By contrast with the vast sums of money regularly
transferred around the globe to facilitate tax evasion in all its
various forms, the volume of cross-currency transfers gener-
ated by drug-smugglers seems to be relatively small. For
example, although Afghanistan may currently be the source
of around 80% of the world’s heroin supplies, it is quite
unreasonable to suppose that anything more than a tiny pro-
portion of the profits accruing from its sale in Europe and
North America ever come anywhere near the country in
which the poppy crop is grown. Drug smugglers may indeed
need to launder their ill-gotten gains, but it makes no sense
for them to seek to do so by investing in the economies of
failed and near-failing states. Meanwhile there is a growing
awareness that the sums required to finance terrorist atroci-
ties are so small that many commentators have likened the
task of identifying such transfers to looking for a needle in a
haystack. The FBI estimates that the cost of mounting the
September 11 attacks was somewhere between U.S.$175,000
and U.S.$200,000, very small beer in the context of the glob-
al forex market. Moreover the bulk of these funds were dis-
patched to the U.S. by wire transfer into an account which two
of the perpetrators opened at the SunTrust Bank in Venice,
Florida.12
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The fact that those funds were transferred through the formal
banking system also raises another important wider question:
to what extent are transfers made through informal sectors,
as is widely assumed, ‘more anonymous’ than those sent
through more established banking channels? In fact there is
good reason to suppose that the opposite is true. By defini-
tion, Hawaladars normally know their customers on a person-
al basis. When such customers transfer substantial sums of
money, the Hawaladars will normally have a pretty shrewd
idea of the sources of those funds, and the purposes for which
they have been dispatched. Moreover, if he knows that there is
a prospect that those funds have been acquired on a serious-
ly illicit basis then the Hawaladar who takes those funds
aboard will be well aware that by implementing that deal he is
implicitly confirming the bona fides of the whole transaction
as far as all his partners in that Hawala network are con-
cerned, needlessly putting the integrity of the system as a
whole at risk. In other words, not only are Hawaladars likely to
be aware of which of their customers might be engaged in
shady deals, but they are also under a significant degree of
systematic pressure to keep clear of such transactions.
By contrast there are good reasons for supposing that serious
criminals have a much better opportunity of preserving their
anonymity by dealing with the formal banking sector. Post 9/11
Know-Your-Customer AML procedures with which all major
institutions in the financial services industry are now required
to conform are expensive to implement, and customers may
often be annoyed by the requirement to produce a variety of
documents to verify their personal identity. However there is
no reason to suppose that those determined to slip beneath
the net would have any difficulty whatsoever in doing so. 
Money, it is worth remembering, is merely a medium of
exchange. It is neither black nor white, and neither guilty nor
innocent. If the authorities are really concerned about track-
ing down serious criminal activities it is becoming increasing-
ly clear that to do so solely on the basis of seeking to identify
‘suspicious transactions’ is highly unlikely to provide positive
results. Whilst smoke does not necessarily conceal a fire, most
serious financial arsonists long since perfected the art of
building smokeless fires. In these circumstances there are no
short cuts. If the security services really want to track down
terrorists, and if law-enforcement officers really want to track
down drug smugglers, neither cracking down on Hawaladars
nor ever more elaborate KYC requirements are likely to be of
much use. If the authorities really want to catch terrorists and
drug smugglers, rather than to generate headlines which sug-
gest to the public at large that something is being done, there
appears to be no alternative to the hard slog of detective work
in which suspect transactions, no matter how complex and
obscure, are tracked right through from one end to the other,
and arrests are made. The current scatter-gun approach,
which appears to be as much directed at the formal as the
informal sector, may well be a vehicle for bringing successful
prosecutions against those who have failed to conform to post
9/11 regulatory requirements. If the ‘war on terror’ goes no fur-
ther than that, such surrogate successes appear to be little
more than diversionary exercises in public relations. In such
circumstances terrorists and drug smugglers will continue to
wend their way through the global financial system with no
greater difficulties than they have so far enjoyed. 
Conclusion 
In my experience the vast majority of Hawaladars have no
great objection, at least in principle, to subjecting themselves
and their operations to regulatory scrutiny, especially if the
central aim of those regulations is to ensure that their facili-
ties are not being surreptitiously utilized by terrorists and
drug smugglers. After all, like all other operators in the finan-
cial services sector they have businesses to run, and client
confidence to maintain. Blithely processing criminal transac-
tions would in no way be worthwhile in straight commercial
terms. 
However, given that they have businesses to run, and that
position of competitive advantage arises precisely from their
capacity to implement long-distance value-transfers on a com-
prehensively lean-and-mean basis, no Hawaladar would ever
wish to be saddled with a requirement to implement elaborate
152 - The Journal of financial transformation
Delivering migrant workers’ remittances
bureaucratic procedures of questionable utility, most especial-
ly if those procedures stood comprehensively at odds with the
way in which his business routinely operated. By the same
token it also makes little sense to demand conformity to a reg-
ulatory regime which was designed for use in a business which
is wholly different in character13. Nevertheless, it is to every-
one’s advantage, except for committed criminals, that Hawala
and other similar IVTS networks should be brought in out of
the cold. But that will only occur when much greater cog-
nizance is taken of the way in which contemporary remittance-
driven value-transfer systems actually operate, such that
appropriately-grounded and genuinely reality-checked regula-
tory procedures can be introduced.
Meanwhile on quite another level altogether, there can be no
doubt whatsoever that IVTS networks are highly effective
service-providers in an increasingly significant corner of the
global financial services sector. Moreover it should by now be
quite clear that informal in this context should not be viewed
as either casual or unsophisticated. IVTS networks are in
essence a highly efficient technical response to some very
substantial logistical challenges. As such they have emerged
as very significant competitors to more mainline institutions
which operate on a more formal basis. But as Gerry Adams
said of Irish republicanism, ‘it’s not going to go away, you
know.’ Just as Japan, and more recently China, have reversed
the terms of trade between East and West through their inno-
vations in the manufacturing sector, we should also not be sur-
prised if similar challenges from below also begin to emerge in
the financial sector. This is not to suggest that there is any
likelihood that Hawaladars will be turning the way in which the
entire established financial services sector operates on its
head. But, it is to suggest that in the specific field of long-dis-
tance cross currency value transfers, the formal sector has a
great deal to learn from its more informal competitors. 
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